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The enlargement of the European Union is approaching fast. Eight Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries are planning to join the EU by 2004 and two CEE countries are 
expected to follow by 2007. Although the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire by the 
accession candidates requires a large degree of macroeconomic convergence and also leads 
one to expect ERM2 and EMU membership, the Central and Eastern European countries still 
pursue rather heterogeneous exchange rate policies. While one group has—though not always 
openly admitted—adopted tight pegs to the euro, a second group has moved towards more 
exchange rate flexibility. This paper argues that currency baskets and flexible exchange rates 
are not sustainable with respect to EU, ERM2 and EMU accession. It explains the rationale 
for the emerging markets to stabilize their exchange rates in general, and the rationale for the 
CEE countries to peg their exchange rates to the euro in specific. Building upon the strong 
motivation to peg the exchange rates to the euro the paper recommends an informal euro 
standard as a first step for the EMU membership of the CEE countries. The informal euro 
standard would facilitate EMU accession by enhancing both nominal and real convergence. 
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Introduction 
 
The European integration process has gained new momentum. In December 2002 the 
European Council approved the EU accession of 10 mostly Central and Eastern European 
countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta) by the year 2004. Bulgaria and Romania did not 
qualify for the first wave of EU east enlargement, but are expected to follow by 2007. 
The EU accession of ten CEE Countries raises the question of their EMU membership. 
As far as the optimum currency area criterion is concerned, as of 2002 most Central and 
Eastern European countries did not qualify for the EMU. The economic divergence between 
the EU and the CEE countries is still large, and the flexibility of labour markets is too low. 
Furthermore, most CEE countries still fail to meet all Maastricht criteria for EMU accession, 
i.e., convergence of inflation, long-term interest rates, budget deficits, cumulative government 
debt, and exchange rates. 
Nevertheless, although EMU membership is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for EU membership, many accession candidates have expressed their strong 
intention to join the EMU as soon as possible. Even more than words paid, a rapid monetary 
convergence of the CEE countries towards the Euro Area heralds EU and EMU accession. 
This begs the question as to the adequate exchange rate strategies. Although eight out of ten 
CEE countries intend to join the EU within a few years there is still no coherent exchange rate 
strategy in Central and Eastern Europe. While one group of countries is preparing for EMU 
accession by close pegs to the euro, a second group has recently moved towards more 
exchange rate flexibility. 
 My argument holds that under the presumption that all CEE accession candidates want 
to join the EMU, currency baskets and exchange flexibility are not a sustainable exchange rate 
strategy. Instead I recommend an informal euro standard in Central and Eastern Europe, 
which would enhance economic stability, intra-regional trade linkages and real convergence.1  
 
A Shift towards more Exchange Rate Flexibility in 
Central and Eastern Europe?  
                                                
 
 
1  Real convergence is understood as catching-up in terms of GDP per capita, implementation of structural 
reforms and the termination of the transition process. The concept of real convergence is rather vague, and no 
specific indicators are formulated in quantitative terms (Lavrač 2002: 12-13). 
While the expected EU accession of ten CEE countries implies a shift towards exchange rate 
stabilization against the euro, some Central and Eastern European countries have recently 
moved towards more exchange rate flexibility. 
The shift towards flexible exchange rates is rooted in the capital market related crisis 
of the second half of the 1990s. During the 1980s and 1990s many emerging markets—
including some CEE economies—opened their capital markets to short-term international 
capital inflows. The international capital market liberalization improved the access to 
international funds and thus accelerated their economic catch-up process. But it also made the 
emerging markets vulnerable to financial and currency crisis: the Mexican Tequila crisis 
(1994), the Asian crisis (1997/98), the Russian flu (1998), the Turkish crisis (2000), and the 
long tumbling and final fall of Argentina (2002) are the most prominent cases. 
Although the CEE countries were not as strongly affected by the financial turmoil of 
the 1990s as many Asian and South American countries, the Central and Eastern European 
currencies were also targets of speculative attacks. In 1997/98 abrupt short-term capital 
outflows and sudden short-term interest rate hikes caused strong economic downturns in the 
region.   
 Learning from the financial crises in Asia, South America and Central and Eastern 
Europe, the IMF recommends emerging markets open to international capital flows to float 
their exchange rates (more) freely (Fischer 2001). According to Stanley Fischer, many 
emerging markets with soft peg arrangements suffered from speculative attacks and 
burdensome devaluations. In contrast, emerging markets with greater exchange rate flexibility 
(for instance Mexico, Israel, South Africa and Turkey in 1998) have mastered the recent crisis 
period better, as flexible exchange rate arrangements allowed them to absorb adverse shocks 
more easily.  
The IMF concludes that in emerging markets open to international capital flows 
pegged exchange rate regimes are inherently prone to crisis and these countries “it is essential 
that floating exchange rates really float” (Mussa et. al. 2000: 34). The IMF even sometimes 
pressures countries to announce an internal monetary standard—such as inflation targeting—
as a substitute for nominal exchange rate anchors. For the CEE countries, which are required 
by the Acquis Communautaire to dismantle all long-term and short-term capital controls, the 
IMF recommends more exchange rate flexibility to cope with high and volatile capital inflows 
during the accession period (Corker et. al. 2000).  
The result of the shift toward more exchange rate flexibility is what Fischer (2001) 
calls a bi-polar world: While some countries have adopted hard pegs or even monetary 
unions, a large number of emerging markets and developing countries are moving towards 
exchange rate flexibility.2  
In the view of the IMF the drift towards corner solutions—the “hollowing of the 
middle”—takes place in Central and Eastern Europe as well (Corker et. al. 2000). According 
to the official IMF classification, since 1997 three CEE countries have moved towards more 
exchange rate flexibility (Table 1). The Czech Republic abolished its DM and dollar-based 
currency basket in May 1997 and floated its currency. The IMF reclassified the Czech 
exchange rate regime as a managed float. In January 1998, the Czech central bank adopted an 
inflation target monetary framework which was followed by a reclassification of the Czech 
exchange rate arrangement as independently floating.  
 
Table 1: CEE Exchange Rate Arrangements According to the IMF Classification 
Country  Classification 
Bulgaria currency board arrangement (€) 
Czech Republic independently floating (inflation targeting framework) 
Estonia currency board arrangement (€) 
Hungary pegged exchange rate with horizontal bands (€) 
Latvia other conventional fixed peg arrangement (against a composite) ($, €, ¥) 
Lithuania currency board arrangement (fund-supported or other monetary 
program) (€) 
Poland independently floating (inflation targeting framework)  
Romania exchange rate with crawling bands (unannounced path) (€) 
Slovak Republic managed floating (other monetary framework) 
Slovenia managed floating (monetary aggregate target) 
Source: IMF: IFS (September 2002).  
 
Similarly, in October 1999, the Slovak Republic abandoned its currency basket arrangement 
in favour of a (managed) floating exchange rate regime. Poland followed suit in April 2000, 
and decided to adopt an inflation-targeting framework and floated the Polish zloty. Because 
the Slovenian tolar has been classified as (managed) floating currency since the early 1990s, 
the official IMF classification of exchange rate arrangements declares four out of ten CEE 
                                                 
2  Managed floating and independently floating exchange rates are classified as flexible exchange rate 
arrangements. Exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender, currency board arrangements and 
other conventional fixed peg arrangements are classified as fixed exchange rate arrangements. Pegged 
exchange rates with horizontal bands, crawling pegs and exchange rates with crawling bands are classified as 
intermediate exchange rate arrangements. 
countries to be maintaining flexible exchange rate arrangements (Table 1). Four countries 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have fixed exchange rates, while Hungary (pegged 
exchange rate with horizontal bands) and Romania (crawling peg with unannounced band) are 
classified as so-called “intermediate exchange rate regimes”. 
The Rationale for Exchange Rate Stabilization 
Although the IMF classification of the CEE exchange rate arrangements fits Fischer's (2001) 
notion of a bi-polar world, two caveats remain. First, the official IMF classifications might not 
correspond to the de facto exchange rate regimes of the respective countries. Second, if a 
country maintains de facto flexible exchange rates, the flexible exchange rates might not be 
sustainable with respect to EU and EMU accession.  
Do the official IMF classifications of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia as floating exchange rate regimes correspond to the de facto exchange rate policies? 
Recently, several authors have argued that in emerging markets and development countries 
the de jure exchange rate arrangements reported to (and by) the IMF might not correspond to 
their de facto exchange rate policies. In an influential paper, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found 
a pervasive “fear of floating” in emerging markets. Reinhart (2000: 69) summarizes the 
rationale for exchange rate stabilization in emerging market as follows:  
 
“When circumstances are favorable (i.e., there are capital inflows, positive 
terms of trade shocks, etc.) many emerging markets are reluctant to allow the 
nominal (and real) exchange rate to appreciate. … When circumstances are 
adverse, the fear of a collapse in the exchange rate comes from pervasive liability 
dollarization. Devaluations are associated with recessions and inflation, and not 
export-led growth.”  
 
Based on the arguments of Calvo and Reinhart, the rationale for the stabilization of the CEE 
currencies is threefold. First, emerging markets might choose to stabilize the exchange rates to 
import macroeconomic stability. Second, stable exchange rates reduce uncertainty for 
international trade. Third, incomplete capital markets (original sin) might give an incentive to 
reduce the exchange rate risk of international debt and short-term capital flows.  
Importing Macroeconomic Stability 
Most emerging markets and in particular the former communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe lack a history of macroeconomic stability. With price controls being removed 
at the beginning of the transformation process in the early 1990s, and hidden inflation 
emerging as a direct consequence, the CEE transition economies suffered from substantial 
inflation. In addition, as tax systems were underdeveloped and central banks were not 
independent, inflation tax has been a common means to finance government expenditure. In 
the early 1990s the inflation rates in all CEE countries were far above the Western European 
level. In some cases—as Bulgaria and Romania—even hyperinflation emerged.   
High inflation increases uncertainty and discourages private consumption and 
investment. From an international perspective inflation and depreciation deter international 
trade and foreign direct investment. Thus, in moving from a planned regime to a market 
economy a key objective of the transformation process has been to establish credibility by 
macroeconomic stability. Because creating a reputation of monetary stability is difficult and 
time consuming, nominal exchange rate pegs—which help anchor both inflation and 
expectations—have been an important tool in importing macroeconomic stability.  
In Central and Eastern Europe, Estonia has been a forerunner in its efforts to stabilize 
macroeconomic performance based on a nominal anchor. The Estonian currency board has 
been in place for more than 10 years without any significant change in the German mark (and 
later euro) exchange rate (Figure 3 in the appendix). The unwavering hard peg contributed to 
a slow but steady decline of inflation towards the Western European benchmark (Figure 5 in 
the appendix). Short-term interest rates had already reached the Western European level in the 
mid 1990s (Figure 7 in the appendix).  
Although most other CEE countries followed less stable exchange rate paths, all of 
them used a variety of exchange rate systems to control inflation. Poland tried a hard peg to 
the dollar in the early 1990s and then switched to a currency basket with declining rates of 
monthly depreciation. Bulgaria started its transformation process with a hard peg to the dollar 
which ended in the hyperinflation of the mid 1990s. Since 1998 a currency board ensures 
exchange rate (and price) stability against the German mark and later the euro. Also the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia and the Slovak Republic adopted currency baskets with different 
and varying compositions.3 Only Romania made no recognizable attempts to stabilize 
inflation and allowed significant depreciations of the leu up to the present time (Figure 4 in 
the appendix). 
As a direct result of the fixed exchange rate arrangements, inflation and short-term 
interest rates in all of Central and Eastern Europe (except Romania) could be gradually 
                                                 
3  Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) give a survey. 
stabilized. While inflation in most CEE countries was far above 20% in the early 1990s, a 
steady decline could be observed in every country (Figure 5 and Figure 6 in the appendix). In 
the late 1990s the decline of inflation and inflation expectations was accelerated by the 
expected EU accession. As required by the Acquis Communautaire inflation rates of the CEE 
countries (except Romania) approached the EU level. Reflecting the slowing path of 
consumer price inflation, short-term interest rates declined as well (Figure 7 and Figure 8 in 
the appendix). 
Besides the positive impact on the stability of (consumer) prices in the CEE countries, 
the nominal anchors also helped to curtail government expenses. With the planned EU and 
possible EMU accession, the fulfilment of the fiscal Maastricht criteria4 by the CEE accession 
candidates has been widely discussed. The public deficits of the CEE countries have been 
surprisingly small—even by the standards of the Western European industrialized countries. 
Public deficits have been low and cumulative debt has been far below the EU average (De 
Grauwe and Lavrač 1999: 2).5  
Low government expenses and public debt is not specific for the CEE emerging 
markets, but a widely observed phenomenon in emerging markets. For instance in East Asia, 
the World Bank (1993) praised the sound government expenditure of the East Asian emerging 
markets in the early 1990s. The IMF found low public deficits and cumulative East Asian 
government debt in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.  
In developing countries and emerging markets, fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange 
discipline are closely linked because tax systems and domestic bond markets are 
underdeveloped (Chin and Miller 1998). If governments are unable to raise money by 
collecting taxes or issuing bonds, printing money is the common means to finance public 
expenditure. Dependent central banks give credit to the governments. If, however, an 
exchange rate peg hinders the government from printing money because it would bring the 
exchange rate under depreciation pressure, fiscal discipline is the only way to ensure 
exchange rate stability.  
Reducing Risk for International Trade 
Exchange rate stability contributes to a stable and growing trade performance. All developing 
countries, emerging markets and transition economies share the characteristic that 
                                                 
4  According to the Maastricht treaty the general government balance must be lower than 3% of GDP. Gross 
government debt must be lower than 60% of GDP (Art. 109j EC Treaty) and the respective protocol.  
5  But recently growing budget deficits have become a matter of concern in some countries as the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
international trade is mostly invoiced in foreign currency. Instead, exports and imports are 
traded in the currencies of the major industrial countries which enjoy the confidence of the 
international business community. Dollar, euro and yen are the most prominent invoice and 
vehicle currencies. 
With most trade denominated in foreign currency, exchange rate fluctuations deteriorate 
the performance of the export sector. If we assume that the government of an emerging 
economy allows the exchange rate of the domestic currency to float freely, the volatile 
international capital flows cause large nominal exchange rate fluctuations—which are 
reflected in profits. 
Because trade contracts are made in foreign currency and fixed for several months, the 
dollar or euro prices remain stable in the foreign markets. This “pricing to market” has the 
merit of stabilizing foreign sales. But if the domestic currency depreciates, profits fall or even 
become negative. If the currency appreciates, profits increase and might compensate for 
former depreciation losses. But even if—despite short-term swings—the value of the currency 
remains by and large constant in the long-term the exchange rate fluctuations cause high 
volatility and risk.6 The transaction costs of international trade rise, which is associated with 
less international trade, less international partition of labour and, to this end, welfare losses.  
To shield the domestic export industry against such pronounced fluctuations of their 
revenues, the government can stabilize the exchange rate. Domestic wholesale prices are 
pinned down to the level of the anchor currency. The prices of traded goods remain stable at 
home and abroad. As price signals and expectations remain reliable, transaction costs fall. 
International trade is fostered and the economy gets an additional growth impulse.  
The incentive to stimulate international trade by stable exchange rates is all the greater, 
the larger the share of exports in GDP. While large industrial countries such as Euro Area, US 
or Japan can afford to address the monetary policy to domestic targets because the export 
sector is comparatively small. Small open economies have a larger incentive to stabilize the 
export revenues because their real output depends heavily on international trade. Stabilizing 
the exchange rate is equivalent to stabilizing the domestic business cycle. Stimulating 
international trade by exchange rate stability is equivalent to stimulating real growth.  
As the emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe are very open economies—
international trade (exports + imports of goods and services) as the percentage of GDP ranges 
                                                 
6  This risk can even not be avoided if the export enterprises of the emerging market decided to shift the 
exchange rate fluctuations to the prices in the foreign markets. The exchange rate fluctuations would be 
reflected in volatile foreign sales.  
from 66% in Poland up to 196% in Estonia (2000)—the incentive to stabilize exchange rates 
is high. Poland, as the largest and least open CEE economy, might have some incentive to 
float its currency more freely—as it has since the year 2000. 
Underdeveloped Capital Markets and Original Sin 
While macroeconomic stabilization and reduced risk for international trade are the traditional 
arguments in favour of fixed exchange rates, the discussion about the pros and cons of 
exchange stability has recently shifted to (international) capital markets. Starting in the 1970s 
the capital markets of most industrial countries were gradually liberalized and opened to 
international capital flows. During the 1990s, many emerging markets followed this 
liberalization process.  
In Central and Eastern Europe—where free and open capital markets did not exist 
under communist rule—the built up of a competitive banking sector and robust capital 
markets has been a prominent goal of the transformation process. This included the (gradual) 
access of international capital flows to domestic capital markets. 
Although the former communist economies have proceeded substantially with the 
liberalization of their capital markets, the task is far from being fulfilled. Lanoo and Salem 
(2001) argue that “as compared to developed economies, banking and securities markets are 
still in early stages of development, and many further steps will have to be taken before 
arriving at levels of mature markets.” Although in countries such as Hungary or Poland short-
term government securities have contributed significantly to the creation of capital markets, 
the development of medium- and long-term bond markets in Central and Eastern Europe is far 
from being accomplished.7 As Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann (1999: 3) put it, the 
capital markets of emerging economies suffer from “original sin”:  
 
        “Original sin” … is a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be 
used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically. In the presence 
of this incompleteness, financial fragility is unavoidable because all domestic 
investments will have either a currency mismatch (projects that generate pesos 
will be financed with dollars) or a maturity mismatch (long-term projects will be 
financed by short-term loans).  
      Critically, these mismatches exist not because banks and firms lack the 
prudence to hedge their exposures. The problem rather is that a country whose 
external liabilities are necessarily denominated in foreign exchange is by 
                                                 
7  The Economist (2002) comments: “Perhaps it was too much to expect Central European countries to 
develop mature and properly regulated securities markets within a few years when it took centuries to 
develop them in the West.”  
definition unable to hedge. Assuming that there will be someone on the other side 
of the market for foreign currency hedges is equivalent to assuming that the 
country can borrow abroad in its own currency. Similarly, the problem is not that 
firms lack the foresight to match the maturity structure of their assets and 
liabilities; it is that they find it impossible to do so. The incompleteness of 
financial markets is thus at the root of financial fragility.  
 
Original sin applies to exchange rate stabilization on both low and high frequencies of 
exchange rate volatility.8 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) as well as Hausmann, Panizza and Stein 
(2001) find a strong relationship between the ability of a country to borrow internationally 
and the pattern of floating: developing countries and emerging economies have a strong 
incentive to keep exchange rates stable at low frequencies—i.e. monthly, quarterly or yearly 
swings of the exchange rate—because liabilities are overwhelmingly denominated in foreign 
currency.  
At the root of the problem is the currency mismatch: domestic banks borrow in euro, 
dollar or yen for lending to domestic firms in domestic currency. Domestic firms borrow in 
foreign currency to invest in projects that generate domestic currency. This currency 
mismatch causes risk as the exchange rate fluctuates. If for instance, the government of an 
emerging market were to allow a sustained or sudden depreciation of the domestic currency 
the balance sheets of the domestic banking sector would be placed at risk. If the real value of 
euro or dollar denominated debts in domestic currency increases, the equity ratio of the 
domestic financial institutions falls.  
Even gradual swings of the exchange rate are harmful, because banks and enterprises 
suffer from a high volatility of their real liabilities. The overall risk for the financial system 
increases.9 “Floating is counterproductive” (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999: 13). The 
monetary authorities of emerging markets are tempted to stabilize exchange rates.  
 While Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) and 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) base their perception of “fear of floating” on low 
frequency exchange rate fluctuations, McKinnon and Schnabl (2002a) explain the motivation 
                                                 
8  I define low frequency exchange rate changes as the monthly, quarterly or yearly gradual swings of the 
exchange rate. High frequency exchange rate changes are defined as daily and weekly percentage exchange 
rate changes. 
9  Even if the domestic currency comes only under depreciation pressure the banking sector might be at risk due 
to the maturity mismatch. If a government seeks to defend a peg by increasing interest rates, domestic money 
supply contracts. The financial institutions will shift the rising interest rates to the enterprises or call their 
loans. Long-term projects which have been financed with short-term loans become unprofitable. The 
enterprises are unable to repay the debt. For the domestic banks currency risk is transformed into default risk. 
Again a banking crisis might result. 
of emerging markets to keep their exchange rates stable at high frequencies—i.e. daily or 
weekly exchange rate changes.  
On a daily or weekly basis original sin creates an incentive to stabilize exchange rates, 
because—with incomplete capital markets—the foreign exchange risk of daily or weekly 
international payment transactions is difficult to hedge. In the highly developed capital 
markets of the industrial countries an investor can hedge an open position in foreign currency 
by financial derivates (forwards) at low cost. This is impossible in the emerging markets and 
transition economies because forward markets don’t exist. As foreign investors don’t accept 
bonds denominated in domestic currency the aggregated10 foreign exchange risk of short-term 
external liabilities remains—by definition—unhedged.  
 Without an efficient forward market risk-adverse importers and exporters cannot 
easily hedge, nor can banks cover open foreign exchange positions. To shield banks and 
enterprises against the risk of exchange rate flexibility the government of emerging markets 
might want to provide a substitute for the missing private forward market. If enough foreign 
exchange reserves are available, the government could issue forwards on its own and thus 
“create” a forward market. But as financial markets are incomplete, the interest rate structure 
might not be deep enough to determine the adequate forward rate. The government might be 
tempted to support “friends” in banks and enterprises by setting the forward rate lower than it 
would be set under free market conditions.  
 Thus, the government could provide a more comprehensive (informal) hedge for short-
term international payment transactions by keeping the exchange rate stable in the short 
terms. Many forward commercial transactions including trade credit are repaid in foreign 
currency on a daily or weekly basis. If the exchange rate remains stable on a day-to-day or 
week-to-week basis, these transactions receive an informal insurance against foreign 
exchange risk. High frequency pegging allows the private banks and enterprises to repay their 
short-term foreign currency liabilities with minimal foreign exchange rate risk.  
Formal Tests for Exchange Rate Flexibility 
The need for macroeconomic stability and the high risk of exchange rate volatility for 
international goods and capital transactions explain the pervasive fear of floating in emerging 
markets. In Asia, Africa, South America, and Central and Eastern Europe exchange rate 
stabilization at low and high frequencies is an important pillar of economic policy. Does this 
                                                 
10  A single bank or enterprise can hedge foreign exchange risk by rolling over the currency risk to another 
domestic bank or enterprise. 
strong rationale for stable exchange rates fit with the official IMF policy in favour of more 
flexible exchange rates? And do four out of ten CEE accession candidates not only de jure but 
also de facto pursue flexible exchange rate strategies? 
Two criteria are applied to test whether or not the exchange rates of the Czech koruna, 
the Polish zloty, the Slovak koruna, and the Slovian tolar are floating currencies as classified 
by the IMF. First, the criteria of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) are used to test for low-frequency 
exchange rate volatility against the euro and dollar. Second, the daily volatilities of ten CEE 
currencies are compared with the daily volatility of the euro/dollar exchange rate as freely 
floating benchmark currency.  
Calvo-Reinhart Criteria 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) use three criteria to measure the extent of open and hidden 
exchange rate stabilization for 155 exchange rate arrangements in 39 countries: monthly 
(percentage) exchange rate changes, monthly percentage changes of official foreign reserves, 
and monthly absolute changes in nominal short-term interest rates. For all three criteria they 
set (arbitrary) probability limits to measure the extent of foreign exchange stabilization.  
First, the degree of exchange rate fluctuations itself indicates stabilization efforts. If, for 
instance, the probability is high that monthly exchange rate changes fall outside a band of 
±2.5%, the currency is rated as freely floating. With a low probability that the monthly 
exchange rate changes fall outside the predetermined band, the currency is classified as fixed.  
Second, governments stabilize exchange rates by intervening in foreign exchange markets. 
For instance, to prevent the domestic currency from appreciating, the monetary authorities sell 
domestic currency in exchange for dollars, euros or yen. The official foreign exchange 
reserves increase. To prevent the domestic currency from depreciation monetary authorities 
will sell foreign against domestic assets. Thus, if the government tries to stabilize the 
exchange rate of the domestic currency, the probability is high that the monthly changes of 
official foreign reserve changes fall outside a predetermined band of ±2.5%. High 
probabilities indicate high intervention activity and fixed exchanges rates. Low probabilities 
indicate freely floating exchange rates.11 
Third, monetary policy can be used instead of foreign reserves for exchange rate 
stabilization. For instance, to prevent the domestic currency from devaluation the government 
might increase interest rates. International capital flows are redirected towards the domestic 
                                                 
11  Given that the governments report the changes in official reserves properly. 
capital markets and the appreciation pressure abates. If the probability is high (low) that 
absolute interest rates changes fall outside the predetermined band of ±4.0% Calvo and 
Reinhart see indication that these countries stabilize (don’t stabilize) the exchange rates via 
monetary policy.  
Table 2 gives an overview over the Calvo-Reinhart exchange rate criterion (ε), the foreign 
reserve criterion (ϕ) and the interest rate criterion (ι) and their respective (arbitrary) bands. 
According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) their probability criteria are superior to the use of 
standard deviations as a measure of exchange rate volatility12 because they avoid distortions 
by outliers, particularly in the case of interest rates. Here both approaches are applied to 
measure the exchange rate flexibility of the CEE currencies. 
 
Table 2: Calvo-Reinhart Criteria 
 Exchange Rate (ε) Foreign Reserves (φ) Interest Rate (ι) 
Criterion 
t
tt
e
ee −= +1ε  
t
tt
F
FF −= +1ϕ  tt ii −= +1ι  
Band ±2.5% ±2.5% ±4.0% 
 
 
The original Calvo-Reinhart criteria are modified in two regards. First, because the exchange 
rates of the CEE currencies can be pegged to either the euro or the dollar in principle, both 
exchange variability against the euro and the dollar is measured. Second, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) chose an arbitrary band of ±4.0% for their interest rate criterion ι. Such a band of ±400 
basis points seems primarily apt to distinguish between high and low interest rate countries.13 
In the CEE emerging markets the probability that short-term interest rates change by more 
400 basis points from one month to the other is extremely small. Therefore, I narrow the band 
(arbitrarily) to monthly changes of ±0.4%. 
 The observation period is from January 1999 to July 2002 for three reasons. First, 
turmoil in the international capital and foreign exchange markets might distort the results. The 
wave of currency crisis in the emerging markets of the years 1997/98 can be assumed to have 
abated by January 1999. Second, the official introduction of the euro in January 1999 might 
                                                 
12  As, for instance, used by Hernández and Montiel (2001). 
13  For low interest rate (industrial) countries the probability that the interest rate changes from one month to the 
other by more than ±4.0 percentage points is (close to) zero, independent from the exchange rate 
arrangement. 
have influenced the exchange rate policies of the CEE countries. Third, the EU accession 
negotiations of all CEE accession candidates had started by January 1999.  
Table 3 reports the results for the Calvo-Reinhart criteria. The euro/dollar exchange 
rate as well as the foreign reserves and the short-term interest rates of the Euro Area and the 
US are used as benchmarks. The exchange criterion ε yields the following results. First, all 
four countries officially classified as fixed exchange rate regimes show low exchange rate 
volatility against the euro. Notably the Bulgarian lev (0.60%), the Estonian kroon (4.65%) and 
the Latvian lat (16.28%) have a significantly lower probability that the exchange rate changes 
against the euro exceed ±2.5% than the benchmark euro/dollar exchange rate (39.53%). 
Lithuania, which re-pegged its exchange rate from the dollar to the euro in February 2002, 
had a very low exchange rate variability against the dollar up to January 2002, but starting in 
February 2002 low exchange rate fluctuations against the euro can be assumed.  Hungary, 
classified as having an “intermediate” exchange rate arrangement, has the same probability 
(4.65%) as the hard peg of Estonia.  
 
Table 3: Results for the Calvo-Reinhart Criteria (1999:01–2002:07) 
 Exchange Rate 
Euro 
Exchange Rate 
Dollar 
Foreign  
Reserves 
Interest  
Rate 
 P σ P σ P σ P σ 
Bulgaria 0.60% 0.44% 37.21% 2.54% 55.81% 5.22% 60.00% 1.12% 
Czech Republic 4.65% 1.46% 39.53% 3.07% 32.56% 5.00% 9.30% 0.28% 
Estonia 4.65% 0.82% 32.56% 2.41% 60.47% 8.77% 60.00% 3.26% 
Hungary 4.65% 1.23% 27.91% 2.48% 65.12% 3.90% 21.95% 0.42% 
Latvia 16.28% 1.86% 2.33% 1.24% 51.16% 5.27% 73.81% 1.27% 
Lithuania* 32.56% 2.47% 0.00% 0.00% 67.44% 7.60% 74.42% 1.59% 
Poland 42.86% 2.65% 28.57% 2.68% 30.95% 2.60% 55.00% 1.57% 
Romania 38.10% 2.47% 38.10% 2.47% 60.98% 6.93% 92.50% 8.38% 
Slovak Rep. 34.88% 2.87% 34.88% 2.47% 55.81% 11.62% n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia 0.00% 0.46% 44.19% 2.62% 59.52% 4.90% 41.86% 0.66% 
US ($/€) 39.53% 2.57%   34.88% 3.17% 13.95% 0.23% 
Euro Area (€/$)   39.53% 2.57% 11.90% 1.54% 9.30% 0.19% 
Source: IMF: IFS. P marks the probability that the respective criterion falls outside the 
predetermined band. σ marks standard deviation of the respective indicator. * As Lithuania 
changed the nominal anchor from the dollar to the euro in February 2002, the observation 
period is from 1999:01 to 2002:01.  
 
Second, the Latvian lat, which has been stabilized against an SDR14currency basket 
since 1994, has low exchange rate variability against both euro (16.28%) and dollar (1.24%). 
The exchange rate variability is lower against the dollar because the dollar has a larger weight 
in the Latvian currency basket.  
Third, out of the group of de jure free floaters—the Czech Republic, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia—two countries seem to peg their currencies de facto to the 
euro. Both the Czech koruna (4.65) and the Slovenian tolar (0.00%) have a very low 
probability that monthly exchange rate fluctuations against the euro are larger than ±2.5%. 
For the Slovenian tolar the probability is even the lowest of all CEE countries. This 
corresponds to the notion that Slovenia had been shadowing the DM before 1999 and is now 
shadowing the euro. Only Poland15, Romania16 and the Slovak Republic have comparable or 
higher probabilities against both euro and dollar than the benchmark euro/dollar exchange rate 
and thereby can be classified as free floaters according to the exchange rate criterion ε. The 
standard deviations widely support these results. 
While the Calvo-Reinhart exchange rate criterion ε is a sound criterion for exchange 
rate stabilization, the foreign reserves criterion φ and interest rate criterion ι have to be 
interpreted diligently. All CEE countries show a significantly higher probability that monthly 
changes of official foreign reserves exceed ±2.5% than the benchmark free floater Euro Area. 
However, the probabilities of Poland (30.95%) and the Czech Republic (32.56%) are close to 
the probability of the benchmark free floater US (34.99%). According to the exchange rate 
criterion ε however, the Czech koruna is classified as a fixed currency and the Polish zloty is 
classified as a freely floating currency. 
 One possible explanation for this puzzle is that the stock of foreign reserves can bias 
the Calvo-Reinhart foreign reserves criterion φ.17 The same absolute purchase (selling) of 
reserves can be reflected in high percentage foreign reserve changes in a country with low 
foreign reserves and low percentage changes in a country with high foreign reserves, even if 
the two countries are the same size. In particular, the US as benchmark free floater has a low 
stock of foreign reserves. Small intervention volumes show up in comparatively large 
percentage changes of official foreign reserves.  
                                                 
14  The SDR’s composition is 45% US dollar, 29% euro, 15% Japanese yen, 11% British pound. 
15  Although Poland floated its currency only since April 2000. 
16  Romania is classified by the IMF as a “crawling peg” (Table 1). 
17  For further evidence see Schnabl (2002). 
To put more emphasis on the foreign reserve criterion, the stock of foreign reserves can be 
used as an additional indictor for exchange rate stabilization. High stocks of foreign reserves 
indicate high past or high intended foreign exchange intervention. Low stocks of foreign 
reserves indicate benign neglect towards the exchange rate. Table 4 shows foreign reserves as 
percentage of GDP (in terms of dollars) giving a notion of this criterion. The stock of foreign 
reserves as percentage of GDP is much higher in the small CEE countries (13.3% – 25.0%) 
than in large industrial benchmark free floaters US, Germany18 and Euro Area (0.3% – 3.4%). 
The highest percentage is measured for the Czech Republic (25.0%) which might explain the 
lower probability for the Calvo-Reinhart foreign exchange criterion. 
Further, Figure 9 and Figure 10 in the appendix, which plot the development of the 
official foreign reserves of the CEE countries and the benchmark free floaters, 
(Germany/Euro Area and the US) show the time path of foreign exchange accumulation. The 
official foreign reserves of Germany/Euro Area and the US have been by and large constant 
since the early 1990s—even with a light downward drift. In contrast, the foreign reserves of 
the CEE countries have been growing steadily, indicating clearly a fear of floating. In Poland 
foreign reserves grew until 2000 when Poland switched to the independent float and have 
remained constant since then. We also observe that in the Slovak Republic and Romania 
official foreign reserves have recently increased strongly. This might herald that exchange 
stabilization against the euro has started. 
 
Table 4: Foreign Reserves/GDP (both US Dollar) 
Country Foreign Reserves/GDP 
Bulgaria 24.63% 
Czech Republic 25.01% 
Estonia 15.12% 
Hungary 19.84% 
Latvia 15.62% 
Lithuania 13.34% 
Poland 14.25% 
Romania 13.69% 
                                                 
18  Note the special status of Germany. The DM exchange rate has been floating freely against the dollar, but up 
to December 1998 the DM was stabilized against the currencies of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
Thus, while the EMS membership is expected to have no direct effect on the DM/dollar and DM/yen 
exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves and interest rates might reflect the exchange rate stabilization 
against other EMS currencies. After the introduction of the euro in January 1999 intervention between the 
former EMS currencies has ceased and the Euro Area as a whole can be regarded as a free floater. 
Slovak Republic 20.23% 
Slovenia 22.56% 
USA 0.29% 
Germany 2.37% 
Euro Area 3.38% 
Source: IMF: IFS. Foreign reserves in US dollars 
2001:12. GDP 2001 in US dollars. 
 
 
Finally, the (modified) Calvo-Reinhart interest rate criterion ι indicates the probability that 
short-term interest rates change more than ±40 basis points. This probability is significantly 
higher for all CEE countries than for the Euro Area and the US except the Czech Republic. 
The low probability that monthly interest rate changes are larger than ±0.4% might indicate 
the advanced monetary and exchange rate convergence of the Czech Republic towards the 
Euro Area. If the Czech Republic follows the ECB interest rate policy tightly and credibly, 
fluctuations of euro exchange rate and foreign reserves are low.  
For all other countries the high probabilities of larger monthly interest rates changes might 
indicate both exchange rate stabilization as in the case of the hard pegs of Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania as well as a (still) higher level of short-term interest rates as observed in 
Poland, Hungary and Romania. An estimation of monetary policy reaction functions is 
necessary for a more precise statement about the impact of the exchange rate on monetary 
policy (Schnabl 2002). 
All in all, the Clavo-Reinhart criteria draw a clear picture of exchange rate stabilization in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Slovenia build a euro club that is striving towards ERM2 and EMU accession. Latvia still 
adheres to a currency basket. Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic pursue floating 
exchange rate policies.  
Daily Exchange Rate Volatilities 
The Calvo-Reinhart criteria were used to identify hidden exchange rate stabilization on a 
monthly basis, i.e., at low frequencies. To complete the picture of foreign exchange 
stabilization in Central and Eastern Europe day-to-day exchange rate fluctuations are 
analysed. High-frequency data have gained importance for the analysis of exchange rate 
policies as the integration of the emerging markets in the world capital markets proceeds 
(Wickham 2002). As outlined in section 0 the daily exchange rate returns reflect the attempts 
of the central bank to reduce the exchange rate risk of short-term international payment 
transactions. A systemized reduction of daily exchange rate volatility is also the prerequisite 
for exchange rate stability at low frequencies. To assess the degree of day-to-day exchange 
rate stabilization the euro/dollar exchange rate is again used as a benchmark.  
The daily returns of the exchange rate of the CEE currencies against the euro are plotted 
in Figure 11 and Figure 12 in the appendix. At a first glance, the patterns of daily exchange 
rate returns correspond to the result of the Calvo-Reinhart criteria. Seven currencies seem to 
have a significantly reduced exchange rate volatility against the euro as opposed to the 
benchmark dollar/euro exchange rate: the Bulgarian lev since 1997, the Czech koruna, the 
Estonian kroon, the Hungarian forint, the Latvian lat, the Lithuanian lita (since February 
2002) and the slovenian tolar. For the Lativian lat the exchange rate volatility can be assumed 
to be even smaller against the US dollar. In contrast, the daily volatilities of the Polish zloty 
(since 2000), the Romanian leu and the Slovak koruna (since 1998) show the characteristics 
of a freely floating currency.   
 For a more formalized comparison of day-to-day exchange rate fluctuations, Table 5 
reports the standard deviations of the daily exchange rate returns against euro and dollar for 
the CEE sample. The observation period is from January 1st 1999 up to May 23rd 2002. As 
Table 5 shows, the standard deviations of daily percentage exchange rate changes are lowest 
for the currency board arrangements of Bulgaria (0.05% against the euro), Estonia (0.10% 
against the euro) and Lithuania (0.03% against the euro since February 2002).  
 Further, the standard deviations of the Czech koruna (0.36% against the euro), the 
Hungarian forint (0.34% against the euro), the Latvian lat (0.46% against the euro and 0.25% 
against the dollar), and the Slovenian tolar (0.23% against the euro) are significantly smaller 
than the standard deviation of the benchmark euro/dollar rate (0.64%). In accordance with the 
conclusion drawn from the Calvo-Reinhart criteria, the Polish zloty, the Romanian leu, and 
the Slovak koruna have high standard deviations against both euro and dollar and thereby can 
be classified as freely floating currencies.  
 
Table 5: Daily Exchange Rate Volatilities against Euro and Dollar 
01/01/99 – 05/23/02 Euro Dollar 
Bulgarian Lev 0.05% 0.63% 
Czech Koruna 0.36% 0.67% 
Estonian Kroon 0.10% 0.64% 
Hungarian Forint 0.34% 0.65% 
Latvian Lat 0.46% 0.25% 
Lithuanian Lita* [0.66%] (0.03%) [0.02%] (0.43%) 
Polish Zloty 0.75% 0.63% 
Romanian Leu 0.89% 0.62% 
Slovak Koruna 1.32% 0.78% 
Slovenian Tolar 0.23% 0.66% 
Dollar/Euro 0.64% 0.64% 
Source: Datastream. Volatility defined as standard deviations of daily 
exchange rate returns. * Note two sub-samples for Lithuania due to 
the shift in exchange rate regime: [01/01/99 – 01/30/02] (02/01/02 – 
05/23/02) 
 
 
I conclude that the de facto exchange rate arrangements of the ten Central and Eastern 
European EU accession candidates can be subdivided into three groups. First, there is a 
dominating euro club with six members: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Slovenia. Second, one country—Latvia—pegs its currency to a currency 
basket which is dominated by the dollar (45%) and the euro (29%). Third, there is a group of 
three countries—Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic—with widely flexible rates. I 
conclude that the majority of Central and Eastern accession countries have already built an 
informal euro zone that heralds ERM2 and EMU accession. 
 
The Shift towards an Euro Zone in Central and Eastern 
Europe  
                                                
 
Given the fact that the euro has already become the dominating anchor currency in Central 
and Eastern Europe, what will be the future path of the CEE foreign exchange policies? The 
dynamics of European integration suggest that the euro zone in Central and Eastern Europe 
will grow further. Neither dollar pegging nor flexible exchange rates are sustainable (ECOFIN 
2000).  
 In the early 1990s the dollar still seemed to be a valuable choice for an exchange rate 
anchor. Since then the European currencies—in particular DM, ECU19 and later euro—have 
steadily gained ground as anchor currencies. In 1990, Poland started its transformation 
process with a hard peg to the dollar, which was soon abandoned in favor a currency basket 
 
19  European Currency Unit. 
with a weight of 55% for four European currencies.20 The dollar was left with a weight of 
45%. Bulgaria also opted for a hard peg to the dollar at the very beginning of its 
transformation process, but after a number of discretionary devaluations (1991-1995) the 
dollar peg collapsed. After a period of hyperinflation (1996/97), Bulgaria introduced a hard 
peg to the DM in August 1997 (later euro).  
The development of the Hungarian currency basket represents the gradual drift from 
the dollar to the euro (Table 6). The first Hungarian currency basket (February 1990) gave 
several European currencies a weight of 57.4%, and 42.6% was devoted to the dollar. In 1991, 
the weight of the European currencies dropped to around 50.0%. Parity with the dollar 
remained in place until May 1994 when the weight of the European currencies (ECU) was 
raised to 70% (dollar 30%). Finally, in January 2000 the euro gained “a weight” of 100% 
heralding Hungary’s ERM2 and EMU accession.21  
Figure 1 compares the development of euro and dollar as anchor currencies in Central 
and Eastern Europe. At the vertical axis a value of 100% corresponds to a complete dollar or 
euro zone respectively. The quarterly values for euro and dollar are computed as follows: For 
all ten CEE countries the composition of the currency baskets is taken from the official IMF 
classifications (IMF various issues).22 The specific weight of the dollar and the aggregated 
weight of all European currencies are listed in the respective quarters of observation starting 
in the first quarter 1990. For instance, for Hungary in the first quarter of 1990, a value of 
0.426 (42.6%) is attributed to the dollar and a value of 0.574 (57.4%) is attributed to the 
European currencies (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Development of the Hungarian Currency Basket 
Date Dollar European Currencies 
February 1990 42.6% 57.4% (DM, ATS, CHF, ITL, FRF, GBP, SEK, NLG, FIM, BEF) 
March 1991 50.9% 49.1% (DM, ATS, CHF, ITL, FRF, GBP, SEK, NLG) 
December 1991 50.0% 50.0% (ECU) 
August 1993 50.0% 50.0% (DM) 
May 1994 30.0% 70.0% (ECU) 
January 1997 30.0% 70.0% (DM) 
January 1999 30.0% 70.0% (Euro) 
                                                 
20  DM, French Franc, Pound Sterling and Swiss Franc. 
21  The horizontal band of ±15.0% around the euro parity shadows ERM2. 
22  There is no evidence that the officially reported weights of the currency baskets did not correspond to the de 
facto foreign exchange policies. 
January 2000 0.0% 100.0% (Euro) 
Source: National Bank of Hungary. DM = German mark, ATS = Austrian shilling, CHF = 
Swiss franc, ITL = Italian lira, FRF = French franc, GBP = British pound, SEK = Swedish 
krona, NLG = Dutch gilder, FIM = Finnish markka, BEF = Belgian franc. 
 
 
If a country has adopted a unilateral peg to the euro (dollar), the maximum value of 1 (100%) 
is attributed to the euro (dollar), and 0 is attributed to the dollar (euro). If there is no 
information about exchange rate stabilization or if the exchange rate is independently floating 
the value of 0 is listed for both euro and dollar. Further, if there is evidence that a currency is 
de facto pegged to the euro while de jure classified as a free float—as in the case of Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic since 1998—1 instead of 0 is attributed to the euro. When the 
exchange rate arrangements or the weights in the currency baskets change, the values are 
adjusted in the respective quarter. Finally, the arithmetic middle of the respective values of all 
ten CEE countries is calculated for every quarter and plotted in Figure 1.23 
Figure 1 shows the respective time path of Central and Eastern European pegging to 
the dollar and the European currencies. The role of the European currencies as anchor 
currencies in Central and Eastern Europe has steadily increased and outperformed the dollar 
since 1997. Even the shift of some countries to more exchange rate flexibility starting in 1997 
could not stop the trend in favour of euro pegging. In the new millennium, the drift towards 
the euro zone has reached a new record high.  
 
Figure 1: Development of Euro and Dollar as Anchor Currencies in the CEE Countries 
                                                 
23  A weighted average by country seize (GDP) would lead to a lower level of exchange rate pegging since 
1997, as the larger countries (Poland and Romania) tend to allow for more exchange rate flexibility. 
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There are three reasons why this trend in favour of a growing euro zone will persist.  
First, the EU accession of the CEE countries requires a convergence of macroeconomic 
policies and thus implicitly a convergence of the exchange rates. Second, the CEE countries 
want to join the ERM2 and EMU as soon as possible. Third, EU accession heralds further 
growing trade linkages with the EU and integration into the European capital markets. 
EU Accession, EMU Membership, and Macroeconomic Convergence 
The EU accession of the CEE countries provides a strong rationale for pegging the exchange 
rate to the euro. Although the EMU accession is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for EU membership the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire as the EU legal framework 
requires macroeconomic convergence. This implies implicit exchange rate stabilization 
against the euro as the foreign exchange policy becomes a matter of common interest.  
The EC Treaty, which is the fundament of the Acquis Communautaire, states that the 
economic policies of the respective EU countries are of common concern and shall be 
coordinated (art. 103). Central Banks are not allowed to give loans to the government and 
related organizations (art. 104). The member states must avoid excessive budget deficits and 
have to comply with the rules of the stability and growth pact (art. 104c).  
Thus, as the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire by the accession candidates 
requires significant degree of macroeconomic convergence, EU membership is a first step for 
compliance with the Maastricht criteria and thus EMU membership. As many Eastern 
European countries want to join ERM2 and EMU as soon as possible, this tendency will even 
be stronger after EU accession.24 In short: “It would look odd if the candidate countries 
invested a lot of effort in the EU accession, but would then not be willing to participate in the 
crowning project, the EMU.” (De Grauwe and Lavrač 1999: 4).  
Indeed, many EU accession candidates have clearly expressed their intention to join 
the EMU as soon as possible—independent from the pro-and-cons of flexible exchanges rates 
during the accession period. For instance, Estonia planned to adopt the euro as official 
currency even before its EU accession in 2001.25 The Hungarian Central Bank states that the 
“accession to the Economic and Monetary Union is one of the most important steps in 
Hungary’s European integration, which will entail abandoning the national currency and 
adopting the euro as domestic legal tender.” (National Bank of Hungary 2002: 1). The Bank 
of Slovenia has clearly defined the medium-term monetary goal “to gain access to the EMU 
as soon as possible” (Bank of Slovenia 2002: 8). The Lithuanian government decided to re-
peg its currency from the dollar to the euro in order to join the ERM2 and EMU as soon as 
possible after EU accession (Alonso-Gamo et. al. 2002: 4).  
 Given the need for macroeconomic convergence and the clear intention of joining the 
EMU, the monetary and exchange rate policies have to be redirected towards closer pegs to 
the euro. More than any public declarations by central banks or governments, the monetary 
convergence between the EMU and the accession candidates heralds EMU accession—
including the freely floating economies Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.  
While the fiscal Maastricht criteria were already met in many CEE countries before 
the accession negotiations started (but have recently become a matter of concern)26, the 
monetary Maastricht criteria were far from being met in 1998.27 Since then the CEE countries 
                                                 
24  After EU accession the new member states are expected to join ERM2 soon (ECOFIN 2000). Further, the 
Acquis Communautaire requires EU member states to accomplish all obligations of EU membership 
including the monetary union. The candidate countries have to join the EMU as soon as they meet the 
Maastricht criteria without the possibility to opt out (as Great Britain and Denmark did). Nevertheless in 
practice the new Central Eastern European members could postpone their EMU membership by simply not 
meeting the Maastricht criteria (as Sweden did). 
25  But as outlined by the ECOFIN Council (2000) unilateral euroization would run counter to the underlying 
economic reasoning of EMU in the EC Treaty, which foresees the eventual adoption of the euro as the 
endpoint of a structured convergence process within a multilateral framework.  
26  As monetary convergence prevents budget financing by inflation tax, fiscal convergence gets more difficult.  
27  Up to the present time, the monetary Maastricht criteria that had to be met by the actual EMU members were 
not redefined for the new members. The present Art. 109j EC Treaty and the respective protocol demand that 
have shown an astonishing speed of monetary convergence. The inflation rates of the CEE 
countries have rapidly approached the EMU benchmark (Figure 5 and Figure 6 in the 
appendix). By mid 2002 the inflation rates of the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania 
and the Slovak Republic had already reached the level of the Euro Area. Estonia, Slovenia 
and Hungary seem to be following. Only the two Central and Eastern European accession 
candidates whose accession has been postponed—Bulgaria and Romania—are still far from 
meeting the Maastricht inflation criterion.  
The convergence of short-term (money market) interest rates in the CEE countries 
shows a similar pattern. Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the appendix show that the short-term 
interest rates of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia have 
come close to the level of the Euro Area. Also Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic are 
converging to the euro level. Only Romania still maintains a considerable higher level of 
short-term interest rates.  
Given the high degree of monetary convergence towards the EMU benchmark it is not 
surprising that since the start of the accession negotiations in 1998 the depreciation path of 
many CEE currencies has slowed down or even abated (Figure 3 and Figure 4 in the 
appendix). The exchange rate volatility against the euro can be expected to fall further as the 
new EU members are expected to join the ERM2 soon after their EU accession.28 To this end, 
at the latest with ERM2 accession, the monetary policy of the accession country becomes a 
matter of common interest and the exchange rate against the euro will become the target of 
monetary policy of all new ERM2 members—including the present free floaters Poland, 
Slovak Republic and Romania.29 
                                                                                                                                                        
inflation must not exceed the average inflation of the three EMU member states with the lowest inflation by 
more than 1.5%. The (long-term) interest rates must not be more than 2 percentage points above the average 
long-term interest rate of the three member states with the lowest long-term interest rate. But as long-term 
interest rates do hardly exist in Central and Eastern Europe, short-term interest rates might be the benchmark. 
Convergence of short-term interest rates in combination with the convergence of CPI inflation implies the 
convergence of “shadow long-term interest rates”.  
28  To join the EMU the nominal exchange rates have to remain within the ERM2 band of ±15.0% for at least 
two years (Art. 109j EC Treaty). In bilateral negotiations the EU and the new member countries determine a 
central rate with a permissible fluctuation band of ±15.0% around the central rate.  
29  Nominal exchange rate stabilization, the concordance with the inflation criterion and real convergence are in 
contradiction, however. Fast real convergence and high productivity growth, particularly in the traded goods 
sector, imply price increases in the non-traded sector (Balassa-Samuelson-effect) and thus higher inflation in 
the accession countries. Real appreciation of the currencies of the accession countries are the inevitable 
consequence (Égert et. al. 2002).  
Integration of Goods and Capital Markets  
As macroeconomic policies and exchange policies in Europe converge, both growing trade 
linkages with the EU and further integration into the European capital markets can be 
expected. This gives an additional rationale to peg the exchange rates to the euro.  
 First, while the CEE economies have already reached a considerable degree of trade 
integration with the European Union, with the EU accession trade creation and trade diversion 
in favour of the euro zone are expected to continue. Intra-European trade will grow even 
further.  
Table 7 shows how the direction of trade of the CEE accession countries has changed 
since the early 1990s. In Table 7 “EU+” is defined slightly broader than EU15, it 
encompasses the EU15 and other potential Western European members of the euro zone than 
the 15 EU countries—namely Island, Norway, and Switzerland. “CEE+” is a broader 
definition of the CEE accession countries which also contains the non-CEE EU accession 
candidates Cyprus and Malta as well as the Balkan countries which peg or are likely to peg 
their exchange rates to the euro. “CIS” defines the former member states of the Soviet Union 
excluding the Baltic countries. “ROW” is the Rest of the World including the United States 
and Japan. EU+ and CEE+ together are assumed to form the potential euro zone. ROW is 
assumed to by-and-large correspond to the dollar bloc.  
 As shown in Table 7 trade of the CEE countries with Western Europe has expanded 
quickly. In 2000 65% of the CEE exports were traded with the EU+, up from 52% in 1992/93. 
58% of the CEE imports came from the EU+, up from 50% in 1992/93. If EU+ and CEE+ are 
added to a potential euro zone, 82% of CEE exports and 70% of CEE imports are traded 
within the euro bloc. If the CIS countries and ROW are added to the world dollar zone only 
19% of CEE exports and 30% of CEE imports are traded within the potential dollar zone.  
Thus, while the integration of the Central and Eastern European goods markets with the EU 
has already reached a high degree, further growing trade linkages and the creation of a 
coherent euro zone in Europe will further increase the incentive to invoice trade in euro and 
thereby to peg the exchange rates to the euro. In fact, the ECB (2002: 40-42) observes in 
Poland and Bulgaria—where data on trade invoicing are available—that the role of the euro 
as invoice currency is steadily growing. 
 
Table 7: Direction of Trade of CEE Countries (Arithmetic Averages) 
Exports EU+ CEE+ CIS ROW Imports EU+ CEE+ CIS ROW 
1992/93 
2000 
52% 
65% 
17% 
17% 
16% 
7% 
13% 
12% 
1992/93 
2000 
50% 
58% 
13% 
12% 
22% 
16% 
14% 
14% 
Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics. EU+ = EU 15 + Island, Norway, and Switzerland; 
CEE+ = CEE accession candidates + Cyprus, Malta, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia; CIS = former members of the Soviet Union except the 
Baltic countries; ROW = Rest of the World including US and Japan. The data for the single 
countries can be found in Table 8 in the appendix. 
 
 
Second, the EU and ERM2 membership also leads one to expect the integration of the 
CEE economies into the highly developed Western European capital markets. As outlined in 
section 0 the CEE countries still suffer from original sin. As capital markets are 
underdeveloped it is difficult and costly to hedge foreign exchange risk. External debt 
denominated in foreign currency is a significant threat to the balance sheets of banks and 
enterprises. During the 1990s, high inflation and devaluation was reflected in high-risk 
premiums on short-term interest rates and missing medium-term and long-term bond markets.  
With EU and EMU accession approaching, the risk of inflation and depreciation is 
declining as the costs of opting out of the accession process become too high. Finally, the 
advent of the euro will put an end to any sovereign monetary policy and inflation differentials. 
Foreign exchange risk will vanish and the growing confidence of the international investment 
community will facilitate the creation of deeper capital markets in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The very difficult task of building a reputation of macroeconomic stability can be 
rather easily achieved as the reputation of the European Central Bank is irrevocably imported. 
The CEE countries will be able to create deeper capital markets faster and more easily than 
any other emerging market. 
 However, instead of building up new own capital markets it might be the better choice 
to participate in the already existing EU capital markets. Instead of taking the burden of 
building up one’s own stock or bond markets—given that exchange rates are irrevocably 
stable—CEE assets can be simply listed in Frankfurt or London. This has three merits for the 
CEE countries: First, the cost and the trouble of building up their own financial markets can 
be avoided. Second, the expertise of the highly developed EU capital markets can be used. 
Third, in financial markets size matters as large financial markets increase liquidity, improve 
diversification and thus reduce the cost of capital.  
If every country would build its own stock and capital markets, the result would be a 
highly fragmented CEE capital market with small transaction volumes. In contrast, in a 
unified EU capital market portfolios will be more efficient and systemic risk will be less. The 
efficient allocation of capital will reduce interest rates and thus promote real convergence in 
the CEE countries and economic growth in the EU as a whole. The ongoing integration of the 
EU capital markets gives a further incentive to use the euro as transaction and invoice 
currency. 
Reduced yields spread between Western and Eastern Europe indicate that the financial 
markets already anticipate the EU accession of the CEE countries and the adoption of the 
euro. The ECB (2002: 28) reports that the euro has become the leading international financing 
currency in Central and Eastern Europe with issuance in euro being about twice that in US 
dollars. Further, the ECB finds that the euro has also become the most important vehicle 
currency in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
 
An Informal Euro Standard as the Optimal Exchange 
Rate Strategy  
 
Floating exchange rates and pegs against anchors other than the euro are clearly incompatible 
with ERM2 membership (ECOFIN 2000). EU, ERM2 and EMU accession of the CEE 
countries imply the the convergence of inflation, interest rates and exchange rates will come 
about sooner or later. I recommend unifying the Central and Eastern European exchange rate 
policies as soon as possible. As the majority of the CEE countries have already introduced 
tight pegs to the euro Latvia, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Romania should join the CEE 
euro bloc. The resulting informal euro standard in Central and Eastern Europe would enhance 
economic stability, economic growth and real convergence. To this end the informal euro 
standard would facilitate ERM2 and EMU membership of the CEE countries.  
The Case against the Currency Basket 
A unilateral peg to the euro is superior to the Latvian currency basket for two reasons. First, 
many observers have proposed that emerging markets should adopt a trade-weighted currency 
basket as an optimal exchange rate strategy to reduce the risk incorporated in diversified trade 
orientation. For instance, Williamson (2000) argues that the East Asian crisis countries should 
abandon their unilateral dollar pegs in favor of currency baskets. He recommends giving a 
weight of 33% to dollar, yen and euro respectively. A similar proposition is made by Kawai 
(2002). From this perspective Latvia’s currency basket seems superior to the unilateral euro 
pegs of Estonia or Lithuania because it reduces the risk for euro, dollar as well as yen 
invoiced trade. 
 But a unilateral peg to the currency of a country with a highly developed capital 
markets is superior to a currency basket arrangement (McKinnon and Schnabl 2002b). As 
outlined in section 2, banks and enterprises in emerging markets are unable to hedge the 
foreign exchange risk of short-term international payment transactions due to original sin. A 
currency basket reduces the foreign exchange risk for all transactions which are invoiced in 
the basket currencies. But the exact future exchange rate against all these anchor currencies 
remains uncertain to some degree. This tendency is even stronger if the weights of the major 
currencies in the basket are somewhat unknown.  
In contrast, a unilateral peg to the euro minimizes the foreign exchange risk for all 
payment transactions with the euro area, which are dominating Latvian external trade (Table 8 
in the appendix). The foreign exchange risk for the remaining dollar (or yen) invoiced 
transactions is high, but can be hedged at low cost via the euro capital markets. A risk-adverse 
Latvian exporter can use the euro/dollar or euro/yen forward market to hedge the foreign 
exchange risk of its dollar or yen invoiced exports at low cost.  
Second, Latvia’s EU and possible EMU accession will further increase the necessity to 
adjust macroeconomic policies. Under a currency basket arrangement a country follows the 
path of the weighted average of the monetary policies of all countries represented in the 
basket. But ERM2 membership and EMU accession will require Latvia to follow solely the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank. This implies a unilateral peg to the euro. 
Hence, if Latvia joins the informal CEE euro standard, it not only provides the Latvian 
banks and enterprises reduced risk for all payment transactions with both the euro area and the 
rest of the world, it also prepares itself for ERM2 and EMU membership.  
The Merits of an Informal Euro Standard with Respect to EMU Accession 
The countries which presently pursue flexible exchange rate arrangements—notably Poland, 
the Slovak Republic and Romania—should join the euro zone. The result would be an 
informal euro standard in Central and Eastern Europe which would enhance the 
macroeconomic stability in the region and strengthen intra-regional trade linkages. To this end 
an informal euro standard would be a first step towards ERM2 and EMU membership by 
enhancing real convergence.  
In contrast to the IMF’s notion that “one size will not fit all” (Corker et. al. 2000: 2), a 
common peg to the euro for all CEE countries would not only reduce the foreign exchange 
risk for Polish, Slovak or Romanian banks and enterprises, it also would contribute to the 
economic stability of the whole region by avoiding competitive “beggar-thy-neighbor” 
depreciations.  
As outlined by McKinnon (2001) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2002a) for East Asia, 
the informal East Asian dollar standard unified the macroeconomic policies of the smaller 
East Asian economies and helped avoiding competitive depreciations. Hence, the informal 
East Asian dollar standard was a pivotal prerequisite for export-oriented growth and the East 
Asian economic miracle.  
Like the smaller East Asian countries, the CEE countries are small open economies 
with shallow capital markets competing in the same export markets. Like the smaller East 
Asian economies the CEE countries are vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations, which effect 
both competitiveness of intra-regional trade and in third markets (EU). But in contrast to the 
smaller East Asia economies, up to late 1990s the foreign exchange and macroeconomic 
policies have been (and still are) much more heterogeneous. Macroeconomic stability, intra-
regional trade linkages and growth performance as a whole have been significantly weaker in 
Central and Eastern Europe than in East Asia.  
Figure 2
Figure 2
 points out the implications of different exchange rate policies for two 
neighbouring countries from the perspective of Estonia. It plots the absolute and relative 
exchange rate swings of the Estonian kroon against the DM (euro) and the Polish zloty. The 
absolute exchange rate is used as a measure of international competitiveness. In the short 
run—when prices are sticky—depreciation is associated with an increasing competitiveness, 
appreciation is associated with a loss in competitiveness. The relative exchange rate 
changes—here monthly percentage changes—are used as a measure of transactions costs of 
foreign trade. High monthly (or daily)30 exchange rate volatility is associated with higher 
uncertainty for international trade and to this end higher transaction cost.31  
As shown in Figure 2 the different exchange rate policies of Estonia and Poland have 
strong implications for both the competitiveness and transaction costs of Estonian foreign 
trade. As it is widely known, Estonia maintained a hard peg to DM/euro since the early 1990s 
while Poland allowed a gradual depreciation of its currency.32 Since the year 2000 the 
depreciation of the Polish zloty has abated, but the Polish zloty fluctuates freely.  
The absolute exchange rates of the Estonian kroon against the euro (DM) and the 
Polish zloty as plotted in the upper panel of  indicate the competitiveness of Estonian 
                                                 
30  Monthly exchange rate fluctuations are simply the  aggregation of daily or weekly exchange rate fluctuations.  
31  For instance to hedge foreign exchange risk. 
32  Poland maintained a currency basket arrangement with gradual depreciation up to the year 2000. 
exports: The hard peg of the Estonian kroon against the euro maintained the competitiveness 
of Estonian exports to the most important EU markets. But the appreciation against the Polish 
zloty eroded the competitiveness of Estonian products against Polish competitors in Estonia, 
in Poland and in the most important third (EU) markets—thus contributing to macroeconomic 
stability in Estonia.33  
The relative exchange rate changes of the Estonina kroon against euro (DM) and zloty 
as plotted in the lower panels of  indicate the transaction costs of international trade. 
The relative exchange rate changes of the Estonian kroon against the euro have been 
significantly smaller than against the Polish zloty. This implies higher transactions costs for 
trade with Poland. Estonian trade is biased towards trade with the Euro Area where exchange 
rates are stable. Intra-regional CEE trade is discriminated. Indeed as shown in Table 8 in the 
appendix Estonian trade with the EU has grown fast in relative terms during the 1990s while 
trade with the other CEE countries has by and large remained the same.  
Figure 2
Figure 2: Exchange Rate Volatility of the Estonian Kroon against DM and Polish Zloty 
 Thus, as shown for the case of Estonia and Poland different exchange policies of the 
CEE neighboring countries that compete in the same EU export markets enhance 
macroeconomic instability and hinder intra-regional trade. An informal euro standard would 
contribute to economic stability and enhance real convergence for three reasons.  
First, an informal euro standard in Central and Eastern Europe would unify 
macroeconomic policies and would eliminate intra-regional competition caused by 
“competitive depreciations”. In this context competitive depreciation can be also understood 
as the disturbances which are caused by minor or gradual depreciations of the currencies of 
neighbouring countries. Second, the informal euro standard not only reduces the transactions 
costs for EU trade, but also reduces the transactions costs for trade among the CEE 
economies. As in East Asia, the CEE economies could profit from a more intensive intra-
regional sharing of labour. The economic catch-up process would not rely solely on trade with 
the EU, but would gain its own intra-regional dynamics.34 
 
                                                 
33  Under these circumstances the fact that the CEE economies compete in the same export markets—notably 
the EU—creates a strategic interdependence in choosing the exchange rate arrangement. If Estonia chooses 
to peg the exchange rate of the kroon to the euro while Poland allows its currency to depreciate, Polish 
enterprises gain a strategic advantage. The Estonian enterprises would loose competitiveness in the EU 
exports markets. Output growth in the Estonia would decline. To avoid the economic downturn Estonia 
might be tempted to depreciate the kroon as well (but did not). 
34  In the smaller East Asian economies intra-regional trade has outperformed trade with all other regions as the 
US, Japan and Europe. 
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Third, the stable macroeconomic performance and growing intra-regional trade would 
also reduce the risk of speculative attacks. As Art. 56 EC Treaty requires the member states to 
dismantle all capital controls many authors have suggested that ERM2 membership under free 
capital mobility might cause economic disturbances in the region, because the CEE countries 
are not any more able to absorb asymmetric shocks by the exchange rate (Corker et. al. 2000). 
Competitive depreciations might endanger the EMU accession of all CEE economies.  
But the informal euro standard will make the CEE countries less vulnerable to 
speculative attacks for two reasons. First, in contrast to the smaller East Asian countries the 
CEE countries don’t face the East Asian dilemma in exchange rate policy (McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2002a): All smaller East Asian countries including China fix their exchange rates to 
the dollar while Japan as important trading partner and competitor in third markets lets its 
exchange rate float freely. This places the members of the informal Asian dollar standard at 
risk if the yen depreciates. Given the strong intra-Asian trade linkages the yen might be the 
better choice for an exchange rate anchor, but due to the deflation in Japan the yen does not 
qualify as anchor currency. 
In contrast, for the CEE countries the euro is the natural anchor currency, as trade is 
strongly focused on the euro zone. As the ECB monetary policy is focused solely on domestic 
targets (inflation and output) the euro qualifies as an anchor currency. Further, due to the 
strong concentration of trade on the potential euro zone there is no major outside competitor, 
which would endanger the competitiveness of CEE exports in the EU markets when the 
euro/dollar rate changes.   
Second, as observed in East Asia during the Asian crisis, due to speculative capital 
outflows, once one member of the informal dollar standard gave up its dollar peg and allowed 
a sharp depreciation of its currency, this triggered competitive depreciations within the 
informal dollar standard. For Central and Eastern Europe this scenario is rather unrealistic: 
With the planned EU and EMU accession of the CEE countries, depreciations are not 
probable because the exit costs are too high. Symbolizing the trust in the EMU membership of 
the CEE countries, in November 2002 Moody’s upgraded the foreign currency rating of eight 
CEE EMU accession candidates to same level as the government bonds of these countries.  
All in all, to eliminate the output volatility caused by the exchange rate fluctuations of 
some CEE currencies, the euro is recommended as a common exchange rate anchor. If all 
CEE countries adhere to the same target of the exchange rate policy, the macroeconomic 
stability will grow and trade linkages will be strengthened. With a more stable trade and 
output performance, the real convergence and thus EU accession could be accelerated. The 
danger of speculative attacks would be banned. 
As in East Asia, this common euro peg would neither necessitate a formal agreement 
(as ERM2) nor a totally unified exchange rate policy. The Central and Eastern European 
accession candidates still require a large amount of structural reforms and preparation for the 
convergence criteria. The Balassa-Samuelson effect might create the need for (controlled) 
nominal and real appreciation. For this purpose an informal euro standard would allow every 
country some exchange rate flexibility within the enlarged euro zone thus contributing further 
to prevent speculative attacks.  
  
Conclusion 
 
While the CEE economies’ unilateral dollar pegs and currency baskets seemed a valuable 
choice for the exchange rate arrangements at the beginning of the transformation process, the 
advent of the euro in January 1999 and the approaching EU accession of many Central and 
Eastern European countries imply a tacit pressure to redirect the exchange rate policies 
towards the euro. Although the IMF recently recommended emerging markets float their 
currencies more freely, this is not a sustainable option for the CEE economies. As the 
approaching EU accession and a possible ERM2 and EMU membership require 
macroeconomic convergence and stable exchange rates against the euro, the Central and 
Eastern European euro club is steadily growing.  
For this reason the countries that have not joined the CEE euro zone by now are 
advised to join the euro club as soon as possible: Latvia should abandon its currency basket 
arrangement, because a unilateral peg to the euro would facilitate macroeconomic 
convergence and reduce the foreign exchange risk of international trade. Poland, Romania and 
the Slovak Republic should stabilize their exchange rates against the euro to enhance the 
macroeconomic stability of the whole accession group. Stable exchange rates against the euro 
would avoid competitive depreciations and thus reduce the macroeconomic volatility for the 
whole region. Reduced transactions costs for international trade would strengthen trade 
linkages among the CEE economies further contributing to economic stability.  
While giving enough leeway for exchange rate adjustment to high productivity 
growth, the newly created informal euro standard would provide both macroeconomic 
stability for the whole accession group and growing trade linkages among the CEE countries. 
Their own economic dynamics would enhance real convergence within the Euro Area thus 
facilitating EMU accession of the CEE economies.  
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Figure 3: Nominal Exchange Rates against DM/Dollar – Luxemburg Group 
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Figure 4: Nominal Exchange Rates against DM/Dollar – Helsinki Group 
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Figure 5: Consumer Price Inflation – Luxemburg Group 
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Figure 6: Consumer Price Inflation – Helsinki Group 
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Figure 7: Short-term Interest Rates – Luxemburg Group 
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Figure 8: Short-term Interest Rates – Helsinki Group 
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 Figure 9: Official Foreign Reserves (Mio. USD)  – Luxemburg Group 
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Figure 10: Official Foreign Reserves (Mio. USD) – Helsinki Group 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1990M1 1992M1 1994M1 1996M1 1998M1 2000M1 2002M1
 Bulgaria  Latvia 
 Romania  Lithuania 
  Slovak Republic   US (benchmark) 
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
2250
1990M1 1992M1 1994M1 1996M1 1998M1 2000M1 2002M1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1990M1 1992M1 1994M1 1996M1 1998M1 2000M1 2002M1
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1990M1 1992M1 1994M1 1996M1 1998M1 2000M1 2002M1
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1990M1 1992M1 1994M1 1996M1 1998M1 2000M1 2002M1
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1990M1 1992M1 1994M1 1996M1 1998M1 2000M1 2002M1
Source: IMF: IFS. Note different scales.
Figure 11: Daily Volatilities against DM/Euro – Luxemburg Group 
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Figure 12: Daily Volatilities against the DM/Euro – Helsinki Group 
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Source: Datastream. Daily percentage changes. 
 Table 8: Direction of Trade of CEE Countries 
Exports EU+ CEE+ CIS ROW Imports EU+ CEE+ CIS ROW
Bulgaria 
1992 
2000 
 
48% 
53% 
 
6% 
16% 
 
10%
8% 
 
37% 
23% 
Bulgaria 
1992 
2000 
 
39% 
46% 
 
5% 
7% 
 
34% 
31% 
 
22% 
25% 
Czech Rep. 
1993 
2000 
 
57% 
71% 
 
27% 
18% 
 
7% 
10%
 
9% 
8% 
Czech Rep. 
1993 
2000 
 
54% 
65% 
 
23% 
12% 
 
15% 
8% 
 
9% 
15% 
Estonia 
1993 
2000 
 
49% 
72% 
 
15% 
13% 
 
30%
10%
 
5% 
6% 
Estonia 
1993 
2000 
 
61% 
58% 
 
7% 
7% 
 
22% 
18% 
 
10% 
16% 
Hungary 
1992 
2000 
 
64% 
70% 
 
5% 
8% 
 
19%
5% 
 
12% 
17% 
Hungary 
1992 
2000 
 
60% 
60% 
 
7% 
7% 
 
28% 
10% 
 
5% 
23% 
Latvia 
1992 
2000 
 
41% 
66% 
 
8% 
16% 
 
45%
9% 
 
6% 
9% 
Latvia 
1992 
2000 
 
32% 
55% 
 
7% 
22% 
 
40% 
17% 
 
21% 
6% 
Lithuania 
1993 
2000 
 
68% 
50% 
 
18% 
25% 
 
7% 
16%
 
8% 
9% 
Lithuania 
1993 
2000 
 
51% 
50% 
 
10% 
11% 
 
32% 
32% 
 
7% 
7% 
Poland 
1992 
2000 
 
65% 
72% 
 
8% 
12% 
 
9% 
7% 
 
19% 
10% 
Poland 
1992 
2000 
 
64% 
63% 
 
6% 
8% 
 
11% 
11% 
 
20% 
18% 
Romania 
1992 
2000 
 
39% 
65% 
 
7% 
10% 
 
19%
4% 
 
35% 
21% 
Romania 
1992 
2000 
 
44% 
58% 
 
7% 
10% 
 
17% 
13% 
 
31% 
19% 
Slovak Rep. 
1993 
2000 
 
30% 
61% 
 
52% 
32% 
 
8% 
2% 
 
9% 
5% 
Slovak Rep. 
1993 
2000 
 
29% 
50% 
 
40% 
21% 
 
23% 
19% 
 
8% 
9% 
Slovenia 
1993 
2000 
 
63% 
65% 
 
21% 
22% 
 
5% 
5% 
 
12% 
7% 
Slovenia 
1993 
2000 
 
64% 
70% 
 
15% 
13% 
 
4% 
4% 
 
17% 
13% 
Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics. EU+ = EU 15 + Island, Norway, and Switzerland; 
CEE+ = CEE accession candidates + Cyprus, Malta, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia; CIS = former members of the Soviet Union except the 
Baltic countries; ROW = Rest of the World including US and Japan.   
 
 
